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Highlights
• Developments in both gas and electricity are fast moving with higher 
risks for stranded assets in Trans-European Networks. This puts 
increasingly higher demands on the CBA method that is used to select 
priority investments. Standing still in the development of that method 
would be going backward.
• The ABC of the CBA for so-called Projects of Common Interest (PCIs) 
is about: A. dealing with interactions between PCIs (coordination); B. 
gaining trust and public acceptance (transparency); and C. deciding 
where the experts stop and the politics start in the valuation of PCIs 
(monetisation).
• To deal with the interactions between PCIs, we recommend additional 
improvements to the clustering of projects and the baseline definition 
in the common CBA method; and we also recognise that individual 
project promoters might lack the information and resources to do this, 
which is why we suggest that this could become a task for the ENTSOs 
or Regional Groups instead of the promoters.
• To gain trust and public acceptance, we recommend harmonised and 
disaggregated cost and benefit reporting, noting that we still have a 
long way to go, and noting that this is not even enough because the 
ambition should be an open source CBA model rather than a common 
method.
• To reduce the politics, we emphasise the importance of a full moneti-
sation of the value of PCIs, and note that we could ask the Regional 
Groups to express their policy priorities at the start of the process via 
the eligibility criteria, which would also increase the transparency of 
the process. 
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 Introduction
To support the EU climate and energy policy objectives 
for 2020 and 2030, the EU infrastructure policy is to 
accelerate investments in projects of common interest 
(PCIs).  e EU is increasingly relying on an economic 
assessment to select these priority projects, i.e. a common 
cost bene t analysis method (CBA).  is is a big step 
forward because the selection process used to be purely 
political, solely relying on the national level for the eco-
nomic assessment of projects. 
Of course, a lot depends on the quality of the CBA 
method that is being used at EU level. Not only do we 
need a good method, we also need a common method 
so that we can compare projects from di erent countries 
and developers.  e EU bodies representing TSOs, i.e. 
ENTSO-E1 and ENTSOG2, are driving the development 
of this method for electricity and gas infrastructure proj-
ects, respectively. 
 e FSR has been involved as advisor to the European 
Commission (EC) and ACER since the beginning of the 
process in 2012.3 In this brief, we focus on three long-
standing issues, an ABC of the CBA: A. how to deal with 
interactions between PCIs (coordination), B. how to gain 
trust and public acceptance (transparency) and C. where 
do the experts stop and the politics start in the valuation 
of PCIs (monetisation)4. 
For each of these issues we recommend the ENTSOs 
together with ACER and the EC to urgently take another 
signi cant step in the development of the method.  e 
context in both gas and electricity (e.g. decentralisation) 
is fast moving with higher risks for stranded assets, put-
ting increasingly higher demands on the method, so 
standing still in the development of that method would 
1. ENTSO-E, 2015. CBA 1.0: ENTSO-E Guideline for Cost Bene t Analy-
sis of Grid Development Projects. FINAL- Approved by the European 
Commission, 5 February 2015. ENTSO-E, 2016. CBA 2.0: ENTSO-E 
Guideline for Cost Bene t Analysis of Grid Development Projects. Ver-
sion for ACER opinion, 29 July 2016.
2. ENTSOG, 2015. Energy System-Wide Cost Bene t Analysis. Approved 
by European Commission on 4 February 2015. INV0175-14, 13 February 
2015.
3. For a discussion of best practices for a good CBA method see Meeus, L., 
von der Fehr, N.H., Azevedo, I., He, X., Olmos, L., Glachant, J.M., 2013. 
Cost bene t analysis in the context of the energy infrastructure package. 
Final report of the EU FP7 Funded Research project THINK (Topic n° 
10/12: http://think.eui.eu). doi:10.2870/60065. 
4. In order to be able to rank and select the projects, the total net bene t, in 
monetary terms, is required.
be going backward. A lot can be done within the current 
institutional setting, and the EC also has an opportunity 
to amend the TEN-E Regulation in 2017, or to propose a 
new regulation in 2020.
1. A. Coordination - how to deal with 
interactions between PCIs
Investments can be independent, competing, or comple-
mentary. Ideally, complementary investments are de ned 
as a single PCI. In practice, this is not always possible, 
which is why we need a CBA method that can discover 
complementary  as well as competing PCIs. If we do dis-
cover them, additional analysis might be needed at the 
regional level to allow a coordinated investment decision.
1.1 Clustering complementary investments into single 
PCI
ENTSOG has no speci c approach for de ning strongly 
complementary investments as a single PCI because it 
is common practice to consider gas pipeline segments 
crossing di erent borders as a single project. In elec-
tricity, projects are typically de ned bilaterally instead 
of multi-laterally. ENTSO-E CBA 2.0 includes a rule that 
all investments in a project cluster should be necessary 
to realise the intended task of the cluster, which can be 
considered as a proxy for complementarity, but there is 
a lot of room for interpretation.5 ENTSO-E CBA 1.0 had 
a clear quantitative rule for clustering, but it did not cap-
ture complementarity.6 
1.2 Baseline or reference grid that can  ag competing 
and complementary PCIs 
ENTSOG compares each PCI against two extreme base-
lines or reference grids, i.e. the business-as-usual grid with 
all PCI projects included (take one out at a time, TOOT), 
and one with no PCIs (put one in at a time, PINT). If a 
certain PCI has a strongly competing PCI, the value of 
that PCI will be much higher in PINT than in TOOT. If a 
PCI has a strongly complementary PCI that has not been 
de ned as a single project, while it should have been, the 
value of that PCI will be much lower in PINT than in 
5. CBA 2.0 also de nes  ve “stages of maturity”; clustered projects can 
maximum be one stage of maturity apart.
6. Every project in a cluster has to contribute at least twenty percent to the 
total grid transfer capability; additionally, the commissioning dates of 
projects in a cluster must remain within  ve years from each other.
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TOOT.  is then  ags the need for additional analysis, 
and ENTSOG also invites project promoters to elabo-
rate the synergies of their projects as part of the qualita-
tive analysis. ENTSO-E’s CBA 1.0 and proposed 2.0 only 
requires promoters to evaluate projects with the TOOT 
method.  ey are also encouraged to do multiple TOOTs, 
which is good for the second step of additional analysis, 
but we also need  PINT in the  rst step.
Recommendations to deal with interactions 
between PCIs
Improve project clustering and baseline de nition 
in the common CBA methods: ACER could require that 
quantitative evidence complements the qualitative rule 
for clustering and it could also require that a method with 
two baselines (TOOT and PINT) is used to fl ag strongly 
interactive PCIs, which in some cases could lead to a more 
detailed supplementary analysis. 
ENTSOs or Regional Groups should apply the CBA 
method rather than individual project promoters: 
promoters might lack the necessary resources and up-
to-date information about the status of other PCIs to 
fully deal with the coordination among projects. The 
ENTSOs could play that role as it is an extension of what 
they already do in the context of the Ten-Year Network 
Development Plans (TYNDP), or the competencies of 
the Regional Groups could be expanded to allow a more 
active role in making a coherent selection of projects of 
common interest in their respective regions. 
2. B. Transparency – how to gain trust and 
public acceptance
 e CBA method of PCIs must adopt the highest trans-
parency standards to be trusted and accepted as the key 
instrument to identify the EU investment priorities for 
energy infrastructure. It is important that the scenarios 
used for the valuation of the PCIs have a su  ciently wide 
scope, and that the costs and the bene ts are reported in 
a harmonised and disaggregated fashion. 
2.1 Scenarios with a su  ciently wide scope
ENTSOG’s CBA method considers micro-scenarios for 
the global context, for supply, for demand and the inter-
action with electricity; two sets of micro-scenarios are 
then used for the assessment. ENTSO-E’s CBA 1.0 and 
2.0 build the set of scenarios from the “four visions” that 
are used in the TYNDP 2016.  e scope of these visions 
is somewhat limited as they all mainly vary in the pro-
jected amount of renewables in the future generation 
mix. As part of the TYNDP electricity 2018, ENTSO-E is 
improving the diversity of scenarios by having more input 
of stakeholders in the selection of scenarios. ENTSO-E 
and ENTSOG (for TYNDP gas 2018) are also co-devel-
oping their respective TYNDP scenario sets which is also 
a positive evolution.
2.2 Harmonised and disaggregated cost and bene t 
reporting
ENTSOG’s CBA discusses an approach to calculate geo-
graphically disaggregated bene ts, but leaves it to the pro-
ject promoters to implement the details of the approach. 
Project promoters have to consider CAPEX and OPEX, 
it is unclear to what extent they have been reported sepa-
rately. ENTSO-E’s CBA 1.0 and 2.0 leave it to the indi-
vidual project promoters to provide geographically dis-
aggregated bene ts. Several cost components are to be 
considered in estimating the total cost, but both methods 
only require the total cost estimate to be reported by the 
project promoters.7 ENTSO-E CBA 2.0 also introduces 
the concept of a complexity factor for immature PCIs to 
explain some of the cost di erences. In other words, there 
are very  rst steps towards a more harmonised consider-
ation of cost and bene ts, but the method does not require 
the promoters to report in a disaggregated fashion.
7. Expected cost for materials and execution costs, expected costs for tem-
porary solutions, expected environmental and consenting costs, expect-
ed costs for replacements, eventual dismantling costs, maintenance and 
operation costs.
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Recommendation to gain trust and public 
acceptance
Harmonised and disaggregated cost and bene t 
reporting: ENTSO-E is doing this already for benefi ts in 
another context than PCIs.8 ACER could impose it for ben-
efi ts, as well as, for costs in the context of PCIs for elec-
tricity, and for gas. For gas, we would then also need a 
more detailed list of cost components.
Open source CBA model (instead of common CBA 
method): National Grid, for instance, made her open 
source electricity scenario simulator9 available for other 
stakeholders to play with. The open source model could 
be made a responsibility of the ENTSOs as it is an exten-
sion of what they do in the TYNDPs. The model could also 
be made available under the patronage of the Regional 
Groups.
3. C. Monetisation – where do the 
experts stop and the politics start in the 
valuation of PCIs
 e whole idea of having a common CBA method is to 
have an economic, rather than a political assessment 
of PCIs. If the experts resort to indicators rather than a 
monetisation of the value of PCIs, they basically push the 
decision back to the political level. It is therefore impor-
tant to go towards a full monetisation, and in the mean-
time reduce the number and improve the quality of the 
indicators.
3.1 Full monetisation of the bene ts (and the costs)
Both ENTSO-E’s CBA 1.0 and 2.0 and ENTSOG’s CBA 
put forward a multi-criteria analysis (MCA) for assessing 
the PCIs, meaning that the bene ts are not all on the 
same monetary footing. Moreover, the monetisation part 
remains restricted to roughly the consumer and producer 
surpluses in the commodity markets.  e ENTSOs moti-
vate this standstill by arguing that they cannot de ne 
appropriate monetary factors such as a value of lost load 
(VOLL) or a cost of disruption per unit of energy (CoDu), 
due to the political sensitivity of these numbers. 
3.2 Reduce the number and improve the quality of 
the indicators
Both ENTSO-E’s and ENTSOG’s CBA methods propose 
several indicators for the non-monetised bene ts, linking 
them to the criteria in the TEN-E regulation such as the 
impacts on sustainability or emissions. ENTSO-E’s CBA 
2.0 has reformulated the indicators covering the security 
of supply bene ts, going from three indicators in CBA 1.0 
to two indicators in CBA 2.0. To what extent the reformu-
lated indicators represent an improvement remains to be 
seen once they have been applied. 
Recommendations to reduce the politics in the 
valuation of PCIs (or to move the politics from 
the economic assessment to the eligibility 
criteria at the start of the selection process)
Full monetisation: ACER could simply require full mon-
etisation. If the ENTSO experts do not feel comfortable 
choosing a value for controversial factors such as VOLL 
or CoDU, ACER or the EC could appoint other experts 
to propose a value. This has already been done for the 
discount factors. It should also be noted that the ENTSO-
E common CBA method for balancing market design 
already adopted the spirit of full monetisation. 
Note fi nally that Regions might still want to express their 
energy policy priorities, such as security of supply or inte-
gration of renewable energy. Today they can do that by 
attributing a diff erent weight to diff erent indicators from 
the MCAs. If we go towards a full monetisation, this is not 
possible anymore. Instead, Regional Groups could be 
asked to express their policy priorities via the PCI eligi-
bility criteria. This would also be more transparent than 
working with weighing factors that are not known to the 
public.8.  e ENTSO-E common CBA method for electricity balancing requires 
the geographical distribution of the bene ts to be reported.  Reference: 
“Cost Bene t Analysis for Electricity Balancing – general methodology” 
prepared by Frontier Economics and Consentec –  nal version 15 June 
2015
9. See National Grid’s Network Options Assessment Report Methodology, 
30 June 2015.
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 e Florence School of Regulation 
 e Florence School of Regulation (FSR) was founded in 2004 as a partnership between the Council of the European Energy 
Regulators (CEER) and the European University Institute (EUI), and it works closely with the European Commission.  e 
Florence School of Regulation, dealing with the main network industries, has developed a strong core of general regulatory 
topics and concepts as well as inter-sectoral discussion of regulatory practices and policies.
Complete information on our activities can be found online at:  fsr.eui.eu
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